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In 2011, the year of the Arab uprisings, 
The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class 
by Guy Standing hit the bookstands. The 
concept precariat describes the condi-
tion of life and labour among educated 
urbanized youth in the twenty-first cen-
tury more lucidly and persuasively than 
the key policy literature on the region, 
as exemplified in The Arab Human 
Development Report (AHDR) 2016: 
Youth and the Prospects for Human 
Development in a Changing Reality. 
This paper argues that any meaningful 
conceptualization of youth in North Africa 
and West Asia going forward should 
incorporate the notion of precariat and 
the condition of precariousness.
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Today’s youth have been cast in a con-
dition of liminal drift, with no way of 
knowing whether it is transitory or per-
manent. (Bauman 76).
In 2011, the year of the Arab uprisings, The 
Precariat: The New Dangerous Class by 
Guy Standing hit the bookstands. 
Standing, a labour economist and 
Professorial Research Associate at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS), gives a name and policy context 
to a new global class of people who labor 
in circumstances of extreme structural 
insecurity, whose lives are “fleeting and 
flexible, opportunistic rather than pro-
gressively constructed” (Standing, The 
Precariat 223). Like Standing, the late 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman was weary 
of the destructive effects of globalized 
modernity on the world’s youth. He wrote 
about youth as being cast into an ocean 
of “liminal drift” (Bauman 76), a metaphor 
which unfortunately has taken on a literal 
meaning as growing numbers of young 
people risk perilous journeys across seas 
and land in search of a tenable and digni-
fied life.
Drawing on decades of work at the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), 
Standing identifies the precariat as a 
growing global class who suffer from “the 
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4 A’s—anger, anomie, anxiety and alien-
ation” (The Precariat 33). He recognizes 
that precarity is a condition that afflicts 
women and men across generations, but 
emphasizes its particular toll on youth 
(“Why the precariat”; The Corruption). We 
should stress that Standing’s ideas particu-
larly pertain to educated, credentialed 
and to some degree, urbanized youth. 
This demographic cohort often gets sub-
sumed under the title of millennials, born 
roughly between 1982 to 2002. We might 
very well call emerging generations, the 
precariats or the precarious generation. A 
large swath of these under-35s have 
played by the rules of supposed merito-
cratic systems of education, often at great 
cost and sacrifice to themselves and their 
families. Yet at the end of long, expensive 
and laborious educational journeys, they 
“are not offered a reasonable bargain” 
(Standing, The Precariat 112).
Standing, while by no means a specialist 
on the Middle East region, what I prefer to 
designate as North Africa and West Asia 
(NAWA), describes the condition of life 
and labor among educated urbanized 
youth in the twenty-first century more 
lucidly and persuasively than the key pol-
icy experts on the region.  The main argu-
ment here is that any meaningful concep-
tualization of, and engagement with, youth 
and generations in NAWA going forward 
should incorporate the notion of precariat 
and the condition of precariousness.
Precarious—an Evolution
The word precarious has undergone a sig-
nificant shift in meaning and usage since 
it first entered the English lexicon in the 
17th century (Gilliver).  Precarious derives 
from the Latin word prex or prec (prayer). 
In its early usage in the 1640s, precarius 
[sic] referred to something “obtained 
through prayer or supplication,” such as 
the right to occupy land or hold a position. 
These favors were “given ‘at the pleasure 
of’ another person, who might simply 
choose to take it back at any time” (Gilliver). 
In this sense, people who were neither 
protected by laws, nor afforded rights of 
citizenship and due process, had to turn to 
God and the propertied and positioned 
class to secure some degree of security. 
By 1680 the word evolved to mean “depen-
dent on the will of another.” This element 
of dependency carried an inherent asso-
ciation with a “risky, dangerous, uncertain” 
situation (Online Etymology Dictionary). 
From the 20th century, the meaning of pre-
carious shifted away from human relations 
of dependency and whim, to refer to inse-
curity resulting from physical danger. For 
instance, precarity would result from an 
“unsound, unsafe, rickety” structure 
(Oxford English Dictionary). In the post-
9/11 period in the United States, the term 
entered critical social theory, most notably 
with Judith Butler’s work, Precarious Life: 
The Powers of Mourning and Violence. 
Butler looks at how the 9/11 terrorist event 
unleashed a transnational chain of precar-
ity for victims and perpetrators of violence. 
In 2011, Guy Standing brought the term 
into the realms of social policy, political 
economy, sociology and labor economics. 
Over the course of three decades, 
Standing has observed the gradual clos-
ing of the commons, the disenfranchise-
ment of workers and demise of citizen 
rights and due process. These changes 
have occurred in a global context in which 
unions and other forms of organizing have 
faced growing assaults. He has watched 
the nature of work fundamentally change 
with the spectacular spread of digital 
technologies and automation. Taking all 
these transformations into consideration, 
Standing merged the words precarious, 
the overwhelming feature of work in the 
21st century, with proletariat, a class desig-
nation, into the precariat. That term was 
evidently coined a decade earlier in Italian 
as il precariato following the 2001 anti-G8 
protests in Genoa (Breman), but Standing 
substantiated it with reams of economic 
data and political and historical context.
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Standing’s critics have taken issue with his 
notion that the precariat might constitute 
an emerging global class. They argue that 
he misunderstands the nature of class and 
that he is too Eurocentric since he draws 
considerably—though not exclusively—on 
data from the Global North (Breman; 
Munck). Theses critiques have some valid-
ity, but they tend to miss the point. 
Standing is not talking about class in a tra-
ditional Marxian sense. Rather, he pro-
vides a language to make visible a wide-
spread pattern of insecurity and anxiety 
connected to changing structures of work 
and rights. As more people recognize pre-
carity as a common condition, as they 
understand the structures, policies and 
norms that perpetuate it, they can poten-
tially build movements and tools to col-
lectively confront and change it. Standing 
insists that the precariat “is a class in the-
making, is the first mass class in history 
that has systematically been losing rights 
built up for citizens” (Standing, “Why the 
precariat”). His observations and argu-
ments are especially germane to the study 
of youth in the 21st century. 
Youth and Precarity
The first reason for the need for a recon-
ceptualization of youth to include the pre-
cariat has to do with ideology and the 
ubiquity of the idea that “there is no alter-
native” (TINA) to the market. In the past 
three decades since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the language and logic of markets 
has seeped into all forms of social and 
economic policy, crowding out other ways 
of imagining and organizing the world. 
States, civil society, Islamist movements, 
non-governmental organizations, global 
finance organizations, United Nations 
bodies and even youth activists, have all 
more or less reinforced policies that steer 
children and youth into a neoliberal global 
order. They support policies of consumer-
ism, marketing, and economic growth 
over more sustainable and fairer alterna-
tives. In areas of citizenship and democ-
racy, they advocate the individual’s right to 
express herself and to self-identify with 
discreet gender and ethnic categories as 
a sort of substitute to building public cul-
ture, deliberating across lines of differ-
ence and organizing for political and 
social change. In other words, a range of 
actors support the fragmentation of the 
polity into micro sub-groups and the nor-
malization of market-oriented neoliberal 
subjectivities. 
In the MENA region, two major events 
have generated tensions within a market 
and individualized discourse and policy 
on youth. First, the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on September 11, 2001, ush-
ered in a more explicit security orientation 
towards Muslim youth, particularly in the 
Muslim majority countries of the Middle 
East and West Asia. Young people became 
matters of containment and security, in 
addition to retaining their positions as 
consumers, individuals and workers in a 
globalized economy (Bayat and Herrera; 
Sukarieh and Tannock). In the ensuing 
years, it was common to read about young 
people as the Generation in Waiting 
(Dhillon and Yousef).2 The logic was that 
while young people were waiting for jobs 
and opportunities, they were in need of 
interventions to offset the potential lure of 
extremism and radicalization. Ironically, 
there was little acknowledgement of the 
effects of western-led wars, arms sales, 
and foreign occupations on the lives, emo-
tional development, political orientation 
and opportunities for young people. 
Instead, a spate of policies from the inter-
national community and NGO sectors 
insisted on programs for democracy pro-
motion, volunteerism and entrepreneur-
ship, which were connected in various 
ways to youth lifestyles and consumerism.3 
Second, and apparently without warning, 
in 2011, millions of people poured into 
streets across the Arab states demanding 
“bread, freedom and social justice.” Young 
people led the calls against their auto-
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cratic rulers. Together with other seg-
ments of the population—factory workers, 
members of professional associations, 
women, the elderly, children, the retired—
they demanded justice, the rule of law, 
the right to live with dignity and to secure 
livelihoods. The western media and schol-
arly community initially celebrated the 
Arab Spring and rebranded young peo-
ple in the region as “non-violent champi-
ons of democracy” and the tech savvy and 
liberal “Facebook youth.”4 However, as 
counter-revolution set in in Egypt and sev-
eral states spiraled into war, with Syria, 
Yemen, and Libya becoming sites of proxy 
wars, unbridled violence and failed states, 
the initial enthusiasm for the uprisings 
abated. The old paradigms for youth con-
tainment and development quickly made 
a comeback. 
Business as Usual: The 2016 Arab Human 
Development Report on Youth
The international community continued its 
development agenda as if the uprisings, 
the most momentous grassroots political 
event in the region in over a half century, 
had not even occurred. The Arab Human 
Development Report (AHDR) 2016: Youth 
and the Prospects for Human Development 
in a Changing Reality, stands as a case in 
point. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has produced The 
Arab Human Development Reports every 
five years since 2002. These reports, 
authored by groups of experts from and 
on the region, are designed to build part-
nerships with local stakeholders and to 
serve as the “instruments for measuring 
human progress and triggering action for 
change.” They specifically provide guide-
lines for “region-specific approaches to 
human rights, poverty, education, eco-
nomic reform, HIV/AIDS, and globaliza-
tion” (UNDP).
The 2016 AHDR report on youth, released 
roughly six years after the start of the Arab 
uprisings, was an opportune moment for 
development scholars and policy experts 
to reflect on the seismic shifts occurring in 
societies across the region. The uprisings 
were a clarion call from millions of people, 
and especially young people, that busi-
ness as usual can no longer be an option. 
Unfortunately, the opportunity was missed, 
and the AHDR 2016 instead put forward 
the old prescriptive model of develop-
ment, amidst overwhelming evidence of 
its decay and failure.
The concepts, participation, empower-
ment and youth agency, frame the policy 
conversation on youth. These concepts 
derive from a human development and 
human capabilities approach which dates 
to the 1990s. A passage from the introduc-
tory chapter reads:
Like its predecessors, this sixth AHDR 
is grounded in a concept of human 
development that embraces human 
freedom as a core value. […] A cen-
tral cross-cutting concept in the AHDR 
2016 is youth empowerment […] Key 
to this concept is a sense of agency, 
whereby Youth themselves become re-
solute actors in the process of change. 
The concept is embedded in self-reli-
ance and based on the realization that 
young people can take charge of their 
own lives and become effective agents 
of change. (25).
By borrowing the market language of 
choice and individual agency, this defini-
tion obscures the notion of power, the 
very core of the word empowerment. In 
fact, it excises politics and power relations 
from the act of empowerment. Instead, the 
report places the individual at front and 
center, relegating the collective, the social, 
the community, to the shadows. The 
authors further obfuscate the potentials of 
youth collective struggle by using the 
terms youth and young people inter-
changeably. The term young people 
denotes human beings of a particular age 
with no especial relation to history. Youth, 
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on the other hand, signifies a social col-
lectivity similar to a social class or an eth-
nic group. A group by definition harbors a 
consciousness of itself as sharing certain 
features and interests, and thereby occu-
pies a distinct place in the power structure 
and the historical process. 
The message to young people is that they 
should pull themselves together, become 
more self-reliant and take charge of their 
individual lives. In other words, they 
should become effective agents of change 
irrespective of structural impediments, 
lack of support by governments or other 
institutions, and without turning to politics 
and organizing. This skewed framing of 
empowerment advances a model of 
development in which young people are 
nudged to break their collective bonds 
with each other in exchange for facing the 
future as competing individuals.
Who, we might ask, are the experts who 
are perpetuating and reproducing these 
ideas? The production and editorial pro-
cesses of these reports are murky at best. 
After the 2016 youth report was released, 
three of the authors of Chapter 4, “The 
new dynamics in the inclusion and 
empowerment of young women,” wrote 
an essay expressing their misgivings 
about the editorial process. They were 
concerned after long passages of their 
chapter on young women were removed 
from the report without explanation, 
thereby altering the meaning and spirit of 
the chapter. They explain: 
Large sections of our text had been 
excised, including one in which we 
gave examples of ways in which young 
women transgress norms surround-
ing marriage and heteronormativity; 
another dedicated to young women 
as producers of culture; and a further 
section about online activism. …[O]ur 
chapter ended up in an obscure edi-
torial process that lacked any proper 
consultation or transparency. …It is 
our understanding that several Arab 
ambassadors were involved in the pro-
cess of reviewing the report. (Al-Ali, Ali 
and Marler).
These authors draw attention to the poli-
tics and hierarchies of knowledge produc-
tion in a multilateral institution. They also 
help to clarify why a reader of the report 
encounters contradictory positions and 
perspectives. In total, 74 people are listed 
as contributing or advising on the report 
in some capacity, broken down as follows: 
14 members of the core team, 18 back-
ground paper authors, 8 members of a 
readers group, 13 UNDP regional bureau 
representatives, and 21 members of a 
youth consultative group. This collection 
of people reflects a diversity of opinions, 
ideological positions and disciplinary dif-
ferences and priorities.
Despite the din of so many voices, one can 
distill the big ideas that underpin the 
major policy priorities around youth. The 
first pertains to the persistent security con-
cerns, translated to the idea that youth 
should be the peacebuilders and peace-
makers. The second big idea relates to 
education and its connection to markets 
and economic growth. The third big ideas 
pertains to youth entrepreneurship, the 
seeming panacea for all forms of eco-
nomic, social and political reform.
Wars and Repression are not Compatible 
with Youth Peacemaking
The 2016 youth report grew out of the 
August 2015 UN Global Forum on Youth 
Peace and Security in Amman, Jordan. 
Following this event the United Nations 
Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 2250 of 9 December 2015, 
which urges “Member States to consider 
ways to give youth a greater voice in deci-
sion-making at the local, national, regional 
and international levels.” The resolution 
highlights, “the threat to stability and 
development posed by the rise of radical-
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ization among young people,” and calls 
for more youth representation as peace 
builders (UN Resolution 2250). 
Policies that position youth as so called 
“empowered peace makers” without 
addressing massive arms sales, the prolif-
eration of militias and weaponry across 
the region, contexts of extreme insecurity, 
the repressive policies of government 
and occupying regimes, disregard reality 
in favor of decontextualized ideology. The 
section of the Security Council Resolution 
2250 that deals with prevention of youth 
violence is a case in point. The resolution 
stresses:
the importance of creating policies for 
youth that would positively contribu-
te to peacebuilding efforts, including 
social and economic development, 
supporting projects designed to grow 
local economies, and provide youth 
employment opportunities and voca-
tional training, fostering their educa-
tion, and promoting youth entrepre-
neurship and constructive political 
engagement (Article 11). 
What, for instance, does “constructive 
political engagement” mean in states 
where young citizens lead exceedingly 
politically precarious lives; where they get 
arrested, disappeared and tortured for as 
little as retweeting a comment, standing in 
a public space to protest an injustice, post-
ing a political joke on Facebook, or danc-
ing in public?5 On a different but related 
note, how can young people find a real 
place at the table of peace negotiations 
and peace-building during times of 
extreme destabilization and militarism, as 
in Syria, Palestine, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, 
Somalia and Sudan, to name just some of 
the countries being decimated by warfare, 
conflict and extreme forms of surveillance 
and repression? In the absence of any real 
recognition of geopolitics and pressure 
on the actors who are creating the situa-
tion of violence and repression, the idea 
of youth empowerment and youth peace-
making rings hollow.
Education is Not About Markets
For decades, the mainstream interna-
tional policy community has been relegat-
ing education and formalized learning to 
a domain of the market. It has focused 
obsessively on educational outputs, test-
ing, privatization and related goals such 
as youth entrepreneurship. In this concep-
tualization, young lives become them-
selves market commodities and a survival-
of-the-fittest mentality reigns (Giroux). For 
critical and engaged educators, it has 
been a matter of great dismay to witness 
the ways in which research and policy 
have narrowly reduced educational insti-
tutions to supposed sites of job prepara-
tion and markets. The AHDR 2016 follows 
a pattern of un-problematically correlat-
ing education with jobs and the demands 
of the labor market. The authors of the 
report reveal ways in which they are driven 
by an ideology of markets and accoun-
tancy principles of inputs and outputs, 
rather than respect for the dignity of chil-
dren, youth and concern for the well-
being of their communities and societies. 
They write: 
Overcoming education system failu-
re must be a priority for policymakers 
and educators, who should strive to 
achieve a good fit between the output 
of educational institutions and the de-
mands of the labor market. This would 
involve a survey of the distribution of 
enrolments across subjects, skills and 
disciplines, upgrades in technical edu-
cation and a review of curricula to pro-
mote problem-solving skills, entrepre-
neurial and management capacity and 
the value of self-employment (UNDP 
184).
Putting aside the reductive understanding 
of education illustrated in this passage, we 
must begin by asking, “What are the 
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demands of the labor market to which 
schools and universities must answer?” 
Currently, the market favors flexible, short-
term, disposable and cheap labor. In other 
words, corporations and global capital 
needs an unlimited supply of young ener-
getic people who are willing to intern, vol-
unteer, work long hours, work remotely, 
work with weak or no contracts, continu-
ously retrain, and not make demands for 
unions, benefits or job security. This grow-
ing class, the precariat, are people who 
are 
living through unstable and insecure 
labor, in and out of jobs, without an 
occupational identity, financially on the 
edge and losing rights. (Standing, The 
Corruption xiii). 
Regrettably, the authors of the AHDR 
seem to have no problem advocating 
even more than before on outputs, test-
ing and market style approaches to edu-
cation. They disregard, indeed implicitly 
support exploitative and unstable work 
conditions for young people that ulti-
mately contribute to personal insecurity 
and politically and socially destabilizing 
societies.
Schools and universities should decid-
edly not be institutions that normalize 
and reinforce precarity. Educational insti-
tutions should certainly play roles in pre-
paring young people for adult roles in 
work and society. However, the propo-
nents of market-oriented education poli-
cies display a callous disregard for the 
ways in which schools and universities 
can strengthen social solidarity and nur-
ture a diverse array of human talents and 
abilities. They do not regard educational 
institutions as places for young people to 
develop bonds and understanding 
across lines of difference, where they can 
think and work together to find creative 
solutions to the enormous challenges of 
contemporary life. Instead, as the main-
stream policy community focuses obses-
sively on outputs, testing and short-term 
rewards, it proselytizes its big idea, youth 
entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship is Not the Solution
North Africa and West Asia is a region with 
a disproportionately high percentage of 
young people, a situation known as a 
youth bulge. It is not clear what percent-
age of the one hundred million 15-29-year-
olds in the predominantly Arab countries, 
a third of the population, are supposed to 
become self-employed entrepreneurs. 
Such a push is reminiscent of the late 
1980s and 1990s, when UN agencies, 
global finance institutions, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations joined forces on 
a massive scale to promote microfinance 
to alleviate poverty. After more than three 
decades of experimentation and data col-
lection, the evidence overwhelmingly 
points to that fact that microfinance does 
not cure poverty, and indeed has been a 
debt trap and a disaster for many. 
Economists who have traced the adverse 
effects of microfinance have argued that 
in actuality, according to the evidence, 
microfinance 
constitutes a powerful institutional and 
political barrier to sustainable econo-
mic and social development, and so 
also to poverty reduction. […] [C]on-
tinued support for microfinance in in-
ternational development policy circles 
cannot be divorced from its supreme 
serviceability to the neoliberal/globali-
sation agenda (Bateman and Chang 13). 
Small-scale, temporary-income-generat-
ing activities should not be conceived as 
a substitute for stable work, social protec-
tions and due process of the law. Likewise, 
evidence is mounting that youth entrepre-
neurship, while it can certainly benefit 
some people in the short term, is more 
likely to lead the young to a debt trap, pre-
carity, and/or a cycle of failures. The debt 
trap is already in clear evidence with the 
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student loan epidemic in which growing 
numbers of students carry debilitating 
debt (Kamenetz). 
While youthful drive and ambition are 
positive qualities to be nurtured and 
encouraged, it is unfair and disingenuous 
to propagate the myth that anyone with an 
idea, grit and determination can be a suc-
cessful entrepreneur. Economist Mariana 
Mazzucato has written extensively on how 
companies in the new economy, such as 
Apple and Google 
that like to portray themselves as the 
heart of US ‘entrepreneurship’, have 
very successfully surfed the wave of US 
government-funded investments. 
The Internet, GPS, touchscreen displays 
and Siri are among the startups that ben-
efitted from steep US government fund-
ing. If Arab governments and businesses 
in the NAWA region are serious about 
youth entrepreneurship, they should pro-
vide resources and support organizations 
to guide and support young talent, not 
lead them down a road of borrowing and 
debilitating debt. 
Conclusion: Youth Studies and Precarity
Change is happening faster than ideas 
and policies to deal with it. As students 
and scholars, as members of international 
development and policy communities 
who want to sincerely advance security, 
dignity, livelihoods and democracy, we 
must acknowledge those misguided poli-
cies that have contributed to the current 
detrimental state of affairs. We collectively 
face the daunting task of forging an alter-
native future. 
If we listen to, respect and take seriously 
the voices of youth that rang out during 
the 2011 uprisings, we will hear that these 
old ideas that have informed education, 
employment and youth policies are not 
working. Those of us working in the NAWA 
region, in youth studies, and education 
and social policy need more than the tools 
of critique to move forward. We need to 
reclaim research and scholarship as a col-
lective means to better understand the 
current realities and challenges. Our work 
should aid in understanding the structures 
of precarity and the responses to them. 
Standing posits that since youth “make up 
the core of the Precariat” they are the ones 
that “will have to take the lead in forging a 
viable future for it” (The Precariat 113). A 
more rigorous and engaged scholarship 
can guide the young towards a road of 
opportunity, security and dignity, rather 
than push them further along a perilous 
path of precarity.
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